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Foreword: Addressing Capital Punishment
Through Statutory Reform
DOUGLAS A. BERMAN*
The Symposium at The Michael E. Moritz College of Law at The Ohio State
University on "Addressing Capital Punishment Through Statutory Reform" and this
issue of the Ohio State Law Journal represent, to my knowledge, the first time
scholars and practitioners have come together to examine the death penalty
specifically through the lens of statutory reform. This fact is as surprising as it is
eventful, because America's history with the death penalty has been a story primarily
about, and directed by, legislative developments.
I. THE CENTRALITY OF STATUTORY DEVELOPMENTS
State legislatures principally have been responsible for the acceptance and
evolution (and even sometimes the abandonment) of capital punishment in the
American criminal justice system from the colonial and founding eras, through the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and now into the twenty-first century. A number
of colonial legislative enactments, though influenced by England's embrace of the
punishment of death, uniquely defined and often significantly confined which crimes
were to be subject to capital punishment.' State legislatures further narrowed the
reach of the death penalty through the early nineteenth century as states, prodded
often by vocal abolitionists and led by developments in Pennsylvania, divided the
offense of murder into degrees and provided that only the most aggravated murderers
would be subject to the punishment of death.2 The late nineteenth and early twentieth
* Associate Professor, The Moritz College of Law at The Ohio State University. I am thankful
for the support of the entire community of The Moritz College of Law at The Ohio State University
and for the help of individuals and groups too numerous to mention in the development and
presentation of this Symposium. I am particularly grateful for the extraordinary work of Amy Ita,
the Journal's student Symposium Editor, without whose efforts this event and this article would
not have been possible.
1 See HuGo ADAM BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 6-7 (3d ed. 1982); CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE DEATH PENALTY 21 (Nina Rivkind & Steven F. Shatz eds., 2001); see
also Davison M. Douglas, God and the Executioner: The Influence of Western Religion on the
Death Penalty, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 137, 155-56 (2000) (noting varying colonial attitudes
and approaches to capital punishment).
2 See BEDAU, supra note 1, at 4-5; see also Edwin R. Keedy, History of the Pennsylvania
Statute Creating Degrees of Murder, 97 U. PA. L. REv. 759 (1949) (discussing Pennsylvania's
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centuries also saw states, as the product of legislative enactments, move away from
mandating death as the punishment for certain crimes by giving juries discretion to
choose which defendants would be sentenced to die.3 Throughout all these periods,
statutory enactments have also played a fundamental role in the evolution of where
and how executions are carried out.
4
Of course, the hallmark of the modem death penalty era has been the
considerable involvement of courts in the regulation of capital punishment,
inaugurated by the U.S. Supreme Court's 1972 landmark ruling in Furman v.
Georgia,5 which invalidated all the capital punishment schemes then in place in the
6states. However, even through this modem era, legislatures and their statutory
choices have remained a principal and central determinant of the capital punishment
landscape.
The Supreme Court itself recognized and legitimized the centrality of legislative
decision to create degrees of murder); LOuis P. MASUR, RITES OF ExECUTON: CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT AND THE TRANSFORMAnTON OF AMERICAN CULTURE, 1776-1865, 50-89 (1989).
3See BEDAU, supra note 1, at 9-11; John W. Poulos, The Supreme Court, Capital
Punishment and the Substantive Criminal Law: The Rise and Fall of Mandatory Capital
Punishment, 28 ARIZ. L. REV. 143, 148-54 (1986); see also McGautha v. California, 402 U.S.
183, 198-200 (1971) (recounting history of American laws allowingjury discretion in ascribing
punishment of death). As Professor Rory Little has noted, the development of the federal death
penalty throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was likewise shaped by legislative
enactments, although historically "Congress has acted not as a leader, but rather as a follower of
well-established state law trends." Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some
Thoughts about the Department ofdustice's Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 360-63 (1999).
4 See BEDAU, supra note 1, at 12-18 (discussing both the cessation of public executions and
the development of seemingly more human execution methods); see also Deborah W. Denno,
Adieu to Electrocution, 26 OHIo N. U. L. REV. 665, 674-76 & app. tbls. 2-3 (2000) (detailing
state-by-state changes in execution methods).
' 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
6 In Furman, a deeply-divided Supreme Court voted 5 to 4, with every Justice writing
separately, that capital punishment schemes which gavejuries complete and unguided discretion in
the imposition of death sentences violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishments. See id. A complete list of subsequent Supreme Court cases regulating the
administration of capital punishment would include more than one hundred decisions. The most
significant precedents following Furman's invalidation of a totally discretionary process for capital
sentencing include: Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding one method of guidingjury
discretion when imposing the death penalty); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)
(striking down mandatory death penalty scheme); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (requiring
the admission of certain mitigating evidence in capital sentencing proceeding); Beck v. Alabama,
447 U.S. 625 (1980) (requiring certain lesser-included offense instructions to be given during
capital trials); and Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (requiringjury instructions sufficient to
ensure capital sentencers can give effect to mitigating evidence). See generally CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (Randall Coyne & Lyn Entzeroth eds., 1994) (collecting
selections from major Supreme Court cases regulating administration of capital punishment);
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note I (same).
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judgments in Gregg v. Georgia,7 wherein the Court relied heavily on the fact that so
many state legislatures had re-enacted capital statutes following Furman to conclude
that the death penalty does not transgress "evolving standards of decency" said to be
the touchstone of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishments.8 And the Supreme Court has subsequently reinforced the significance
of legislative action by repeatedly asserting that state statutes are to be the first, and
most important, consideration when gauging the "standards of decency," which are
determinative of a punishment's constitutionality.9
In this context, it is especially telling that the Supreme Court recently decided to
accept certiorari in a case challenging the constitutionality of executing persons with
mental retardation.' ° The Court's decision to reconsider this issue, despite having
previously held in Penry v. Lynaugh" that defendants with mental retardation could
be lawfully executed, appears to be the direct result of the fact that fifteen state
legislatures have decided to prohibit the execution of mentally retarded defendants
since the Penry ruling.
12
The Supreme Court's decision to reconsider the constitutionality of executing
persons with mental retardation is only one of many recent events that has brought
renewed attention to capital punishment and only one of many signs that we are in the
midst of a pivotal new period in the modem American story of the death penalty.
Fueled by media reports and academic research about various problems with the
7 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
'See id. at 179-81.
9 See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,370-71 (1989) ("[F]irst among the objective
indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction are statutes passed by society's
elected representatives.") (internal quotations omitted); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 332-35
(1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,829 (1988); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 154
(1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 792-93 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 594
(1977); see also Earl Martin, Towards an Evolving Debate on the Decency ofCapitalPunishment,
66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 84, 100-03 (1997) (discussing the Supreme Court's reliance on state
statutes in developing its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence).
'
0 See Atkins v. Commonwealth, 510 S.E.2d 445 (Va. 1999), cert. granted sub. nom. Atkins
v. Virginia, 70 U.S.L.W. 3232 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2001) (No. 00-8452), cert. grant amended 70
U.S.L.W. 3233. The same day that the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Atkins, the Court
dismissed as improvidently granted the certiorari writ in McCarver v. North Carolina, another case
that concerned the constitutionality of executing mentally retarded defendants. This dismissal
followed a decision by North Carolina's legislature to pass a new statute that categorically banned
the execution of persons with mental retardation. See Frank Green, Va. Case to Serve as Testfor
Court, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Sept. 26,2001, at A l (discussing grant of certiorari in Atkins
and dismissal of McCarver); Stan Swofford, Justices Avoid N.C. Execution Case, GREENSBORO
NEWS & REC., Sept. 26, 2001, at B I (discussing dismissal of McCarver appeal).
" 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
12 See, e.g., Raymond Bonner, North Carolina to Bar Executing the Retarded, N.Y. TMES,
Aug. 4,2001, at A 10; see also Lyn Entzeroth, Putting the Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendant
to Death: Charting the Development of a National Consensus to Exempt the Mentally Retarded
from the Death Penalty, 52 ALA. L. REv. 911 (2001) (discussing these legislative developments).
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administration of the death penalty throughout the United States, elected politicians
and the general public over the past few years have been closely scrutinizing and
significantly questioning our criminal justice system's embrace of this ultimate
punishment.
13
One clear and dramatic recent turning point in the public and political dialogue
about the death penalty was Illinois Governor George Ryan's bold decision in
January 2000 to impose a moratorium on executions in his state following the
exoneration of thirteen innocent persons wrongly convicted and sent to Illinois' death
row.14 Though Governor Ryan's imposition of a moratorium in Illinois is an
executive action, the roots of his decision-and a primary catalyst for new public and
political awareness about problems in the administration of capital punishment-
actually lies in earlier legislative action. In 1996, Congress withdrew funding for Post-
Conviction Defender Organizations' 5 and also greatly restricted prisoners' access to
federal courts through the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). 16
This legislation helped set the stage for a significant increase in the number of
executions over the last five years'7 and also diminished the opportunity for the most
questionable capital convictions and sentences to be examined and remedied through
13 See Timothy V. Kaufman-Osbom, Regulating Death: Capital Punishment and the Late
Liberal State, 11l YALE L.J. 681,682 (2001) (noting that "the question of capital punishment is
disputed today in a way that it has not been since the 1970s"); Wayne A. Logan, Casting New
Light on an Old Subject: Death Penalty Abolitionism for a New Millenium, 100 MICH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2002) (manuscript at 1, on file with author) ("Not since 1972, when the Supreme
Court invalidated the death penalty as then applied, has there been such palpable concern over its
use .... ); Ronald J. Tabak, Finality Without Fairness: Why We Are Moving Towards Moratoria
on Executions, and the PotentialAbolition of Capital Punishment, 33 CONN. L. REV. 733,734-43
(2001) (reviewing the evidence and growing awareness of the numerous problems infecting the
administration of capital punishment in the United States); see also Thomas Healy, Death Penalty
Support Drops as Debate Shifts, BALT. SuN, July 25,2001, at IA (discussing renewed public and
political attention to the death penalty).
14 See Joseph L. Hoffman, Violence and the Truth, 76 IND. L.J. 939, 944 (2001) (discussing
developments in Illinois as sending "a shockwave that continues to reverberate across the country
(and around the world)"); William Claibome & Paul Duggan, Spotlight on Death Penalty: Illinois
Ban Ignites a National Debate, WASH. POST, June 18, 2000, at A l (discussing impact of Ryan's
moratorium decision on public opinion and political debates concerning capital punishment); see
also Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment, at http://www.idoc.state.il.us/cep/index.html
(2000) (outlining the study of the death penalty in Illinois following Governor Ryan's imposition
of a moratorium on executions).
" See Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-34 (1996).
16 See Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217-26 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244-2266
(Supp. 1 1997)).
17 In the five-year period from 1991 to 1996, there were on average about forty executions per
year in the United States, whereas in the five-year period from 1997 to 2001, there were on average
nearly eighty executions per year. See Richard Stewart, All-time Execution Record Likely, Hous.
CHRON., Dec. 8, 2000, at 1; Death Penalty Information Center, Number of Executions by Year
Since 1976, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/dpicexec.html (last modified Dec. 12, 2001).
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post-conviction processes.' 8 By creating the conditions for more executions and more
problematic executions, Congress all but ensured that the modem administration of
the death penalty would be subject to renewed attention and greater examination.
Indeed, three years before Governor Ryan's imposition of a moratorium in
Illinois, congressional action to speed the pace of executions prompted the American
Bar Association to pass a resolution urging a moratorium on all executions until
jurisdictions implemented a series of death penalty reforms.' 9 The ABA's appeal for a
moratorium, though stated in broad and general terms, seems directed primarily
toward legislatures, because the reforms advocated are most viable through statutory
enactments.2° The force of the ABA's recommendation--coupled with continuing
concerns about the possibility of wrongful convictions and also broader concerns
about racial disparities and other inequities in the administration of the death
penalty-has resulted in a sea-change in the politics of the death penaltyf and has
prompted legislative reform proposals'for capital punishment in the U.S. Congress
and in nearly every state that utilizes the death penalty.22
It was against this dynamic and still-developing backdrop that academics and
practitioners convened at The Moritz College of Law at The Ohio State University in
late March 2001 for two days of insightful and productive discussions on the topic of
"Addressing Capital Punishment Through Statutory Reform." Through a series of
panels on the first day, commentators took stock of these developments in the law and
s See Kaufman-Osbom, supra note 13, at 681-82 (discussing how recent limitations on
capital case review and restricted defense funding has meant that "the gears of the machinery of
death are now unusually well-greased").
19 See Report with Recommendations No. 107, 1997 A.B.A. SEC. INDIVIDUAL RTs. & RESP.,
available at http://www.abanet.org/irr/rec 107.html (Feb. 3, 1997) [hereinafter ABA Report]; see
also James E. Coleman, Jr., Foreword: The ABA 's Proposed Moratorium on the Death Penalty,
61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 1,3-4 (1998) (discussing how congressional death penalty legislation
in 1996 "figured prominently in the ABA's adoption of the Moratorium Resolution").
20 See ABA Report, supra note 19, at 1-2; see also Symposium, The ABA's Proposed
Moratorium on the Death Penalty, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Vol. 61, No. 4 (1998) (special issue
with a series of articles examining ABA's moratorium resolution).
21 See Jonathan Alter, The Death Penalty on Trial, NEWSWEEK, June 12, 2000, at 24, 26-34
(noting changes in political rhetoric concerning the death penalty); John Harwood, Bush May Be
Hurt by Handling of Death-Penalty Issue, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2000, at A28 (suggesting "a
national shift in the politics of capital punishment"); see also Hoffman, supra note 14, at 940-41
(reviewing reasons why "[e]ven the broadest measures of public sentiment reflect a significant
recent shift in attitudes about the death penalty").
22 During the live Symposium, Richard C. Dieter, Executive Director of the Death Penalty
Information Center, detailed the considerable amount of legislative activity taking place across the
country on a range of death penalty issues. The substance of Mr. Dieter's presentation and a list of
proposals to reform capital punishment can be found at his organization's web site. See Death
Penalty Information Center, Proposed Changes in the Death Penaly Around the US. 2000-2001,
at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/Changes.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2002); see also Toni Lacy,
Push to Reform Death Penalty Growing, Advocates: Mistakes Could Shake Confidence in System,
USA TODAY, Feb. 20, 2001, at 5A (detailing legislative proposals relating to the death penalty).
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politics of the death penalty at the national level. An opening panel examined broad
institutional dynamics by addressing the importance and impact of statutes and
politics in the administration of the death penalty.23 Subsequent panels explored the
need and means to reform who is sentenced to death24 and the need and means to
reform how death penalty sentences are ascribed, reviewed, and carried out.2 5 A final
panel on the first day of the Symposium expanded horizons by looking for lessons in
the modem history of capital punishment extending beyond the United States and
even beyond the administration of the death penalty. On the second day of the
Symposium, the focus shifted from the national story to the state of Ohio's unique
experience with the death penalty. A series of presentations on this "Ohio day" of the
Symposium grounded and enhanced the analysis of evolving death penalty issues
through the careful examination of one state's distinctive place in these broader
developments.26
I am very pleased that so much of what was said during the live portion of the
Symposium is reflected and memorialized in the pages of this special issue of the
Ohio State Law Journal. And because a few paragraphs cannot adequately reflect the
many important themes and ideas developed by the leading academics, policy-
makers, and practitioners who played a role in this event, I will not endeavor here to
summarize the work of our contributors but will simply let their own words speak for
themselves. Instead, to conclude this Foreword, I want to explain briefly why I
thought it so important to convene leading voices in this field to discuss the value of,
23 For a written account of some of the discussion during this panel, see Austin Sarat, The
"New Abolitionism "and the Possibilities ofLegislative Action: The New Hampshire Experience,
63 OHIO ST. L. J. 343 (2002); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, ShouldAbolitionists Support
Legislative "Reform "of the Death Penalty?, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 417 (2002) [hereinafter Steiker &
Steiker, Should Abolitionists Support].
24 For a written account of some of the discussion during this panel, see Victor L. Streib,
Gendering the Death Penalty: Countering Sex Bias in a Masculine Sanctuary, 63 OHIO ST. L.J.
433 (2002); Ronald J. Tabak, Striving to Eliminate Unjust Executions: Why the ABA Individual
Rights & Responsibilities Section Has Issued Protocols on Unfair Implementation of Capital
Punishment, 63 OHIo ST. L.J. 475 (2002).
23 For a written account of some of the discussion during this panel, see Deborah W. Denno,
When Legislatures Delegate Death: The Troubling Paradox Behind State Uses of Electrocution
and Lethal Injection and What it Says About Us, 63 OHIo ST. L.J. 63 (2002); James S. Liebman,
Optingfor Real Death Penalty Reform, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 315 (2002) [hereinafter Liebman, Death
Penalty Reform].
2' For a written account of some of these presentations, see Margery Malkin Koosed, The
Proposed Innocence Protection Act Won't-Unless It Also Curbs Mistaken Eyewitness
Identifications, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 263 (2002); S. Adele Shank, The Death Penalty in Ohio:
Fairness, Reliability, and Justice at Risk-A Report on Reforms in Ohio's Use of the Death
Penalty Since the 1997 Ohio State Bar Association Recommendations Were Made, 63 OHIO ST.
L.J. 371 (2002); Joseph E. Wilhelm& KellyL. Culshaw, Ohio's Death Penalty Statute: The Good,
the Bad, and the Ugly, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 549 (2002); see also Dana K. Cole, Expanding Felony-
Murder In Ohio: Felony-Murder or Murder-Felony?, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 15 (2002).
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and possibilities for, statutory reform of the modem administration of capital
punishment.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF, AND HOPE FOR, STATUTORY REFORM
All the recent media coverage about the death penalty highlights that it is now a
special and critical moment, both historically and politically, in the modem American
story of capital punishment, and thus an appropriate time to review and draw lessons
from the recent history of the death penalty. Such review leads me to conclude that
appellate courts, particularly federal courts considering habeas petitions, have not
proven particularly well-suited to remedy systemic problems in the administration of
capital punishment (and may not even be particularly effective at policing the
application of the death penalty in individual cases). This disconcerting reality-
which I suggest below may be institutionally inevitable--entails that ensuring an
accurate, fair, and reliable death penalty system may be a job primarily for
legislatures.
Starting with the landmark ruling in Furman, the U.S. Supreme Court has spent
the last three decades requiring and shaping reforms of death penalty procedures
through interpretations of the Eighth Amendment in an effort to ensure greater
reliability in the application of this ultimate punishment.27 Yet, despite earnest and
considerable efforts, it is now widely accepted that the Supreme Court's work over
the past thirty years in regulating capital punishment has been, in the words of
Professors Carol Steiker and Jordan Steiker, "a stunning failure on the Court's own
terms. ' ' 8 Whether documented by the voluminous academic criticisms of the
27 See supra note 6 (discussing some major Supreme Court cases).
28 Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades
of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARv. L. REV. 355, 403 (1995)
[hereinafter Steiker & Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts]; see also Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141,
1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (concluding that, despite the
Supreme Court's continual efforts, "no combination of procedural rules or substantive regulations
ever can save the death penalty from its inherent constitutional deficiencies"); Scott W. Howe, The
Failed Case for Eighth Amendment Regulation of the Capital-Sentencing Trial, 146 U. PA. L.
REV. 795, 862 (1998) ("he Court's experiment with capital-sentencing regulation counts among
its major modem failures. The Court has accomplished very little of value, after investing vast
judicial resources."); James S. Liebman, The Overproduction ofDeath, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030,
2048-57 (2000) [hereinafter Liebman, Overproduction] (describing the death penalty system that
has developed from Supreme Court regulation as "perverse,". "immensely expensive,"
"penologically risky," and "egregiously prone to substantive error"); Logan, supra note 13,
(manuscript at 10, on file with author) (explaining that judicial regulation "has yielded a capital
punishment system of enormous expense and bewildering complexity, which, paradoxically, shares
much of the arbitrariness condemned in Furman"). But cf David McCord, Judging the
Effectiveness ofthe Supreme Court's Death Penalty Jurisprudence According to the Court's Own
Goals: Mild Success or Major Disaster?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 545 (1997) (suggesting that the
Supreme Court's regulatory efforts have been at least partially successful).
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Supreme Court's capital jurisprudence,29 or by the ever-growing empirical and
anecdotal evidence that the administration of the death penalty is not significantly
more reliable, accurate, or fair today than thirty years ago,30 there is a consensus that
the modem death penalty system is badly broken despite the Supreme Court's
considerable regulatory efforts.
31
Though there are many and varied accounts of the sorry state of capital
sentencing,3 2 I see these developments revealing certain fundamental institutional
realities concerning the work of the Supreme Court in the regulation of the criminal
justice system. The Supreme Court, as the ultimate interpreter and expounder of
constitutional limitations, is necessarily and only concerned with what may qualify as
a minimally acceptable death penalty scheme. As Justice Scalia often cheekily
stresses in his opinions, the Court is not charged with assessing or exploring what
would serve as a maximally effective sentencing scheme. 33 That is, the Supreme
Court is only expected and required to determine constitutional floors establishing the
minimum sentencing procedures states must utilize; the Court is not required to, nor is
it likely to, address policy alternatives that might reveal preferable sentencing
procedures that states could utilize. Moreover, because of the Justices' attentiveness
to issues of federalism and the separation of powers, the Supreme Court is
understandably (and many would say appropriately) institutionally inclined to set such
29 See, e.g., supra note 28; see also Louis D. Bilionis, Legitimating Death, 91 MICH. L. REV.
1643, 1647-48 & nn. 20-22 (1993) (citing many sources while noting that "[c]ritics have been
giving the Court's death penalty jurisprudence a bad name for years .... Dozens of articles each
year take the Court to task for the wide array of outrages and blunders... with few, if any, kind
words to be said for the path the Court has taken.").
'o See, e.g., Tabak, supra note 13, at 734-43 (detailing evidence of systemic problems with
the administration of capital punishment); Penny J. White, Errors andEthics: Dilemmas in Death,
29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1265, 1268-84 (2001) (lamenting the "multitude of errors that occur in
capital cases" and reviewing recent developments which have made the "imperfections of
America's capital punishment system" that much "more demonstrable and more disturbing");
ABA Report, supra note 19; see also Christi Parsons, ABA Chief Seeks Halt to Executions, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 4, 2001, at II (noting various reasons and studies supporting ABA's continued
advocacy for moratorium on executions).
3 Professor James Liebman has aptly used the term "broken" to describe the modem death
penalty system in his recent examination of reversal rates in death penalty cases. See James S.
Liebman et al., A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995 (2000), at
http://www.law.columbia.edu/instructionalservicesliebman [hereinafter Liebman, A Broken
System]; see also Liebman, Overproduction, supra note 28 (discussing reasons whymodem death
penalty system is broken).
" See generally supra notes 28-31.
13 See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 427-29 & n.* (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(lamenting other Justices' unwillingness to acknowledge the "unhappy truth that not everyproblem
was meant to be solved by the United States Constitution, nor can be"); see also Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498-99 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring) (assailing Justice Breyer for
"proceed[ing] on the erroneous and all-too-common assumption that the Constitution means what
we think it ought to mean. It does not; it means what it says.").
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constitutional floors as low as possible.34
Because of these institutional realities, it is ultimately not very surprising that,
despite a seemingly endless stream of death penalty rulings over the past three
decades, the Supreme Court's capital jurisprudence actually places "relatively
minimal demands on states seeking to administer the death penalty. 35 Consequently,
it also should be unsurprising that the Supreme Court has failed to engineer fully
effective system-wide remedies to the various systemic problems-for example, the
wrongful conviction of innocent persons, racial disparities and other inequities in who
is sentenced to die, the poor quality of representation received by many capital
defendants, the poor treatment ofjuveniles and mentally disadvantaged defendants--
that continue to plague the administration of capital punishment in the United
States.36
34 See, e.g., Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437,442-44 (1992) (asserting that interpretations
of the Due Process Clause in criminal cases must show deference to "considered legislative
judgments"); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,996-1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (stressing principles of federalism and separation of powers
to justify a very limited role for the Supreme Court in judging the proportionality of sentences);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 n.50 (1976) (upholding Georgia's capital sentencing scheme
while asserting that "unrealistic conditions" which might "indirectly outlaw [] capital punishment"
cannot be placed on the death penalty); see also Bilionis, supra 29, at 1669-81 (discussing the
impact of "the institutional and structural considerations that argue for judicial restraint" on the
Supreme Court's capital jurisprudence).
" Steiker & Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts, supra note 28, at 371; see also Callins v.
Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (asserting that "the Court has
chosen to deregulate the entire enterprise [of capital sentencing], replacing, it would seem,
substantive constitutional requirements with mere esthetics, and abdicating its statutorily and
constitutionally imposed duty to provide meaningful judicial oversight to the administration of
death bythe States"); William J. Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Death by Default: An Empirical
Demonstration ofFalse andForced Choices in Capital Sentencing, 77 TEX. L. REv. 605,618-22
(1999) (discussing "Supreme Court decisions [which] have relaxed both statutory restraints on, and
judicial scrutiny of, guided discretion in capital sentencing"); Robert Weisberg, Deregulating
Death, 1983 SuP. CT. REv. 305 (identifying an earlytum in Supreme Courtjurisprudence to limit
the constitutional requirements on capital sentencing).
36 The last thirty years of court regulation may also reveal that lower appellate courts are also
relatively ineffective, or at the very least inefficient, even in policing the application of the death
penalty in individual cases. Professor James Liebman's study of reversal rates in capital cases not
only documents how often appellate courts find capital convictions legally problematic, but also
reveals that many layers of appellate review are needed to recognize the multitude of errors
committed in capital cases, which in turn further suggests that many injustices in capital cases may
still go unremedied. See Liebman, A Broken System, supra note 31; see also Liebman, Death
Penalty Reform, supra note 25, at 316 (detailing significant percentage ofreversals in each level of
appellate review while stressing that "even the entire, three-tiered [court] inspection process is not
infallible").
This reality may, yet again, be the product of certain institutional realities in appellate court
review of individual death sentences. Though all the problems that infect the modem
administration of capital punishment are apparent and striking when capital punishment is
2002]
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One primary goal of this Symposium has been to highlight that we now may be
able to turn to legislatures to find some hope within an otherwise discouraging story
about the reform of capital systems. Before the recent sea-change in public opinion
about the death penalty, elected lawmakers seemed politically compelled to champion
their unwavering support for the death penalty 7 and often backed up campaign
examined from a system-wide perspective, these problems can often fade in significance and
impact when any individual case is examined. When each death sentence is reviewed on a case-by-
case basis-which, of course, is how appellate courts confront the death penalty-the well-
documented systemic problems are readily overshadowed by the often gruesome facts of the
crimes that typically are eligible for the death penalty. The day-to-day reality for appellate courts,
especially for federal courts hearing collateral attacks on death sentences in habeas cases, is that the
capital defendant's crime provides a distorting lens through which the court sees issues on appeal.
Although reviewing courts may well generally recognize and want to eliminate system-wide
problems in the administration of capital punishment, it is still a challenge for a reviewing court to
identify and remedy these systemic problems in any individual case when an awful murder has
been convincingly pinned on a particular defendant and ajuryhas not onlyretumed a guilty verdict
but also called for death as the punishment. Put simply, the immediate case-specific realities can all
too readily eclipse system-wide concerns.
The Supreme Court's decision in the (in)famous case of McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279
(1987), reflects these fundamental institutional dynamics. To its credit, the Supreme Court
accepted the validity of the Baldus study showing racial disparities in capital sentencing outcomes
and essentially conceded that there was a system-wide racial problem in Georgia's application of
the death penalty. See id. at 292. But the Supreme Court denied habeas relief to the defendant,
saying that it could not identify any overt intentional racial discrimination in McClesky's own case,
and that it was not institutionally suited to provide a constitutional remedy in the absence of such
evidence. See id. Similarly, my own experiences in helping to represent on appeal Terry
Washington, a mentally retarded man executed by the State of Texas in 1997, showed me first-
hand how case-specific matters can overshadow systemic problems in individual death penalty
cases. Washington was a black man with an IQ measured as low as 59 and a gruesome childhood
who allegedly stabbed a white female co-worker in a restaurant. On appeal, we had a little evidence
raising questions about guilt and a lot of evidence of horrible lawyering by the court-appointed
lawyer who was a specialist in divorce law and did not even realize that Washington was mentally
retarded, nor that he could request a court-appointed expert to explore Washington's mental
condition. Appellate courts, often emphasizing the details of the crime, turned deaf ears to all of
our arguments claiming ineffective assistance of counsel; the Fifth Circuit all but conceded that
Washington's trial lawyer was deficient for not effectively presenting mitigating evidence, but held
there was no prejudice because the nature of crime would have produced a death verdict
nonetheless. See Washington v. Johnson, 90 F.3d 945 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied 520 U.S. 1122
(1997).
37 See, e.g., Michael Mello, A Letter on a Lawyer's Life of Death, 38 S. TEx. L. REv. 121,
202-03 (1997) (discussing "a grizzly right of every fall election cycle: the executioner's song as a
central theme in political campaigns, with politicians playing 'can you top this' with each other
about how passionately they themselves 'believe in' the death penalty"); Symposium, Politics and
the Death Penalty: Can Rational Discourse and Due Process Survive the Perceived Political
Pressure?, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 239, 240,266-68, 270-73 (1994) (giving examples of political
campaigns stressing support for the death penalty); Alan Berlow, The WrongMan, THEATLANOC
MoNTiLY, Nov. 1999, at 66, 78 (describing political gains by elected officials from portraying
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promises by expanding the number of capital offenses 38 and limiting capital
defendants' opportunities for appellate review.
39
However, as previously detailed, the political climate surrounding the death
penalty has shifted dramatically over the past few years as a result of greater public
awareness of the problems plaguing the administration of capital punishment,
particularly the problem of wrongful convictions. 40 The new public and political
dialogues mean that politicians can now speak more soberly and realistically about
flaws in the administration of capital punishment, even in those jurisdictions in which
not long ago it was an act of political suicide for an elected official to criticize the
death penalty in any way.41
As a closing thought, I want to suggest that this new legislative era is both
understandable and especially important in light of an insightful observation made by
John Stuart Mill in his renown "Speech in Favor of Capital Punishment. ' '42 Stressing
that the "practical power" of a punishment "depends far less on what it is than on
what it seems," Mill asserted that the death penalty for atrocious murderers is "the
least cruel mode in which it is possible adequately to deter from the crime. 43 Mill
claimed that because the punishment of death "makes an impression on the
themselves as especially "tough" on the death penalty).
38 See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of Today's
Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. & MARY BnILRTS. J. 345,396-99
(1998) (documenting that, in 1995 and 1996 alone, well over a dozen states expanded the reach of
their death penalty laws by "adding [new] aggravating circumstances, expand[ing] existing
aggravating circumstances, [or] adding to the definition of capital murder"); see also Leigh
Dingerson, Reclaiming the Gavel. Making Sense Out of the Death Penalty Debate in State
Legislatures, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 873, 876 (1991) (noting that 1990 state
legislative sessions created over 185 death-penalty-related bills in 43 states and that "most bills
have favored the expansion, expedition or reinstatement of capital punishment").
'9 Congress enacted the most conspicuous and consequential recent limits on capital
defendants' appellate review opportunities through its restrictions on federal habeas corpus in the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. See Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(codified in part at 28 U.S.C. § § 2244,2253-2255, 2261-2266 (2000)). Within the past decade, a
number of state legislatures have also restricted capital defendants' opportunities for appellate
review. See Steiker & Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts, supra note 28, at 423 & n.324 (listing
statutes).
40 See supra notes 13-22 and accompanying text; see also Sarat, supra note 23, at 347 (noting
evidence that "the political climate [around the death penalty] seems to have altered"); Steiker &
Steiker, Should Abolitionists Support, supra note 23 (discussing recent changes in public and
political views on the death penalty).
41 See, e.g., Alter, supra note 21; G. Terry Madonna & Michael Young, Pennsylvanians
Increasingly Back Moratorium on the Death Penalty, ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, August 23,
2001, at A 17; Tom Mashberg, U.S. Resolve for Death Penalty Weakens, BOSTON HERALD, June
10, 2001, at 8.
41 John Stuart Mill, Speech in Favor of Capital Punishment 1868, in PILOSOPHICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON PuNISHMENT 271 (Gertrude Ezorsky ed. 1972).431 d. at 272.
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imagination so entirely out of proportion to its real severity," it is a more effective
deterrent than the alternative of life imprisonment which is "less severe indeed in
appearance, and therefore less efficacious, but far more cruel in reality."
44
Of course, empirical evidence has never fully substantiated Mill's hypothesis that
the death penalty is a superior deterrent to life imprisonment, as studies on capital
punishment's deterrent effects have generally proved inconclusive at best.45 Yet,
Mill's insight about capital punishment's "impression on the imagination" still merits
considerable attention, especially when contemplating the potential for, and direction
of, future reforms of the death penalty and the entire criminal justice system. Though
the punishment of death may not significantly impact the behavior of potential killers,
the awesomeness of this punishment indisputably does impact the behavior of our
criminal justice institutions. In particular, we are seeing today the ways in which the
drama of the death penalty-the fact that we are, in Mill's words, "so much shocked
by death '46-fuels a genuine and considerable interest in legislatures and legislators,
and in the public at large, to be particularly cautious and conscientious before fully
embracing and comfortably imposing the punishment of death.
The new public awareness of errors in capital cases combined with the death
penalty's "impression on the imagination" is what now is allowing legislators to speak
and act more soberly and realistically about a range of criminal justice issues
pertaining to capital punishment. Moreover, because all the major problems identified
in the administration of the death penalty (for example, wrongful convictions, racial
and other disparities, poor quality and funding of defense counsel) are not unique to
capital punishment, but actually plague the entire criminal justice system, advocates
who have traditionally opposed the death penalty because of due process and equal
protection concerns should consider taking advantage of the unique opportunity
presented by capital punishment's "impression on the imagination" to work toward
developing legislative reforms which would be a step toward remedying problems
that infest the entire criminal justice system.47
44 Id.
45
See, e.g., Ruth D. Peterson & William C. Bailey, Murder and Capital Punishment in the
Evolving Context of the Post-Furman Era, 66 SOC. FORCES 774 (1988); Jon Sorenson et al.,
Capital Punishment and Deterrence: Examining the Effect of Executions on Murder in Texas, 45
CRIME & DELINQ. 481,481 (1999); see also Michael Radelet & Ronald L. Akers, Deterrence and
the Death Penalty: The Views of the Experts, 87 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 7(1996) (reporting
that 87.5% of criminologists do not believe the death penalty has deterrent effects).
46
See Mill, supra note 42.
41 The recent movement in many states toward allowing defendants, and not just capital
defendants, access to DNA testing-see, e.g., Bill Giving Convicts Access to DNA Testing
Becomes Law, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Apr. 6, 2001, at 36A (discussing new Texas statute);
Ashley Lowery, New Law Allows Prisoners to Request DNA Tests, SOUTH BEND TRIBUNE, Jan. 7,
2001 (discussing Michigan bill allowing prisoners to apply for DNA testing within a five-year time
frame)-is a significant and important example of the system-wide reforms that can be engendered
by concerns over errors in capital cases. See generally Sarat, supra note 23 (discussing how death
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In other words, I am suggesting that Mill's insight may actually point to a
different sort of pragmatic, utilitarian argument for supporting (or at least tolerating)
the death penalty. In modem America, capital punishment's "impression on the
imagination" may be needed to ensure that our legal institutions do not get
complacent about problems that pervade our criminal justice system, and may even
provide a critical means to engineer remedies to system-wide problems through well-
crafted legislative reforms. If this Symposium in some way helps kick-start the engine
of such reforms, it has been a huge success.
penalty concerns help transform political dialogues about criminal justice issues).
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